Why don't you two get a room? A puzzle and pricing model of extra services in hotels. by Damianov,  D.S. & Sanders,  S.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
01 September 2015
Version of attached ﬁle:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Damianov, D.S. and Sanders, S. (2012) 'Why don't you two get a room? A puzzle and pricing model of extra
services in hotels.', Journal of industrial organization education., 6 (1). p. 1035.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/1935-5041.1035
Publisher's copyright statement:
The ﬁnal publication is available at www.degruyter.com
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Journal of Industrial Organization
Education
Manuscript 1035
Why Don't You Two Get a Room? A Puzzle
and Pricing Model of Extra Services in Hotels
Damian S. Damianov, University of Texas - Pan American
Shane D. Sanders, Western Illinois University
©2012 De Gruyter. All rights reserved.
DOI: 10.1515/1935-5041.1035
Brought to you by | University of Durham
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/1/15 11:07 AM
Why Don't You Two Get a Room? A Puzzle
and Pricing Model of Extra Services in Hotels
Damian S. Damianov and Shane D. Sanders
Abstract
This case study focuses on the following “rational riddle” raised in a recent popular economics
book: Hotels in Britain usually charge per guest while hotels in the US typically charge per room.
What is the reason for this difference? We propose a pricing model for extra services which points
to one possible explanation.
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Introduction 
 
In The Armchair Economist: Economics and Everyday Life, a popular economics 
book, Steven Landsburg presents the following “rational riddle”: “When two 
people share a hotel room in Britain, they often pay twice the single-room rate; in 
the United States they usually pay much less than that.  What accounts for the 
difference?  A non-economist might be satisfied with an answer based on 
tradition.  The economist wants to know why this pricing structure is rational and 
profit-maximizing.  If any reader has a suggestion, I’d be pleased to hear it.” (pp. 
17-18).  
Landsburg leaves this question unanswered, and the purpose of this teaching 
case is to show how an economist might pursue an answer to this “rational 
riddle.” In the following pages, we illustrate how a plausible explanation of this 
phenomenon can be constructed by using one of the economists’ favorite tool—
the simple monopoly pricing model.  
In our model, the main factor that accounts for the difference in the pricing 
policies is the “number of cheaters.” Underreporting the number of guests is 
presumably much easier and much more likely in large hotels with many guests 
than in small bed and breakfast inns. In his book (North America 1862), 
Englishman Anthony Trollope observes, “Hotels in America are very much larger 
and more numerous than in other countries” (555).  Though almost 150 years 
have passed since Trollope’s observation, small bed and breakfast inns (i.e., 
hotels run from a home or home-styled structure) have a markedly higher market 
concentration in the present-day United Kingdom than in the present-day United 
States.  In the United Kingdom, bed and breakfast inns generated revenues of 
approximately $3.2 billion in 2009 within a tourism industry that generated 
approximately $137 billion in the same year (Bed and Breakfast Association, 
2010).  That is, bed and breakfast inns generated approximately 2.3 percent of 
United Kingdom tourism revenues in 2009.  In the United States, bed and 
breakfast inns generated revenues of approximately $1.04 billion in 2007 within a 
tourism industry that generated approximately $767 billion in the same year (U.S. 
Census, 2007).  That is, bed and breakfast inns generated only 0.14 percent of 
United States tourism revenues in 2007.  Though hotel industry data are not 
uniform enough for us to conduct a full comparison of hotel types, this 
comparison offers some evidence that small inn-type hotels are more concentrated  
in the United Kingdom than in the United States.  In the absence of general data 
on the topic, it is plausible to further assume that British hotels are on average 
smaller than their American countertype.  Given this supposition, in the following 
model we will assume that it is more costly to maintain a stowaway at the typical 
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British hotel than at a typical hotel in the US. We show that, as a consequence, 
British hotels find it optimal to charge a higher second guest price.1 
 
The Model 
 
a. Preliminaries 
 
We consider the pricing decision of a hotel serving guests who travel either alone 
or in pairs. The utility of a single-occupancy guest is given by 
     0 	        ,  
 
where   is the reservation price of the consumer and   is the price of single 
occupancy. The expected utility of consumers who travel in pairs is given by 
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where  is the added price of the second occupant, and  is the probability that 
the second guest will be detected. If the unreported guest is detected, the couple 
will be required to pay  for the extra guest, so the expected payment to the hotel 
equals . The last term, , captures the additional (inconvenience) cost for the 
couple of stowing away one of the guests, which is strictly increasing in the 
probability of detection. We further assume that  is uniformly distributed on the 
interval !0, ", and  is the size of the double occupancy market. The size of the 
single-occupancy market is . For simplicity we further assume that the hotel’s 
marginal cost of renting a room is zero, and the room capacity of the hotel is non-
binding.  
 
b. The monopoly pricing problem 
 
It is straightforward that the hotel will charge the reservation price    for the 
first guest. Given a price of  for the second occupant, a couple will cheat if and 
only if  
                                                           
1
 It is important to note that the availability of substitute hotels also influences second guest 
pricing.  If one took a British inn and transplanted it somewhere in the U.S., it is likely that the inn 
would charge a lower second guest price once transplanted.  This prediction is based upon the 
existing availability of cheap substitutes for the second guest in the U.S.  Thus, we might expect 
second guest price differences to hold across the two countries even for similar types of hotels. 
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2     # 2       $ 
 % 1   . 
 
Hence, the number of double-occupancy honest pairs is   ())  and the 
number of attempted-cheater pairs is ()) . The profit of the hotel is thus 
 *+,  - . 1   /  . +1   , . -  1   / + . ,. 
 
The first term captures revenue from the single occupancy customers  
and the number of cheating couples ())   all of whom pay only the single 
occupancy price  . Eventually, a fraction   of the cheating couples will be 
detected, and they will need to pay the hotel the extra guest price  . This 
additional revenue is represented by the second term, and the third term accounts 
for the revenue of the couples who honesty declare and pay the double occupancy 
charge of  . . Rearranging terms we obtain 
 
*+,   +1  , +, .  . 0 . 1. 
 
The first order condition yields the following profit maximizing price: 
 
  2 · +1  , 
 
The optimal price is thus strictly increasing in the probability of detection, . Hence, the optimal price for the second guest is greater in England where the 
probability of detection is greater.  
 
c. Cheating, second guest demand elasticity, and optimal pricing 
 
Another approach for deriving the direct relationship between the probability of 
detection  and the optimal price  is through the elasticity of the demand for the 
second guest. Observe that, for a given price , the number of pairs who will pay 
for the second guest is given by 3+,  4  ()) 5 .  ()) . The first term 
represents the number of pairs who reported the second guest truthfully, and the 
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second term captures the number of cheating pairs who are detected. The 
elasticity of demand is given by 
 
6  37 +, · 3+,  
+1  ,   1    . +1  , 
 
As the marginal cost of a room is assumed to be zero, the profit 
maximizing price  for the hotel is the price for which the hotel maximizes its 
revenue, i.e. the price for which the elasticity 6  1. Solving this equation for  we obtain the optimal price   
  2 · +1  , 
 
Conclusion 
 
The simple pricing model developed here offers a possible explanation to 
Landsburg’s “rational riddle.” The model illustrates how the optimal price for the 
second guest depends on the probability that “cheaters” (pairs that do not report 
the second guest) will be detected. When the probability for unregistered guests 
for being detected is greater, the demand for the second guest is less elastic, i.e. 
couples are more likely to report and pay for the second guest. The inverse 
elasticity rule of monopoly pricing tells us that when demand is more inelastic, 
the monopolist sets greater prices.  Hence, the second guest prices in British inns 
are greater. 
The resolution of the riddle thus lies in the characteristics of the 
establishment and the market structure of the industry in various regions. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the United Kingdom features a greater 
concentration of small “inn-style” hotels than does the United States.  It is 
therefore reasonable to conclude that relatively high extra person charges in the 
United Kingdom result from relatively low rates of guest underreporting.  We 
offer an example of optimal pricing as a homework exercise. 
 
Homework problem 
 
Assume that the reservation price of a guest is   $80, the cost parameter  is 
uniformly distributed over the interval [0,64], and unreported guests are detected 
with a probability of   20%. Assume also that there are a total of 64 couples 
and 30 single-occupancy consumers. 
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a) Set up the profit maximization problem of the hotel and determine the 
optimal prices for the first and the second guest. How many couples report 
the second guest and how many couples cheat? How many cheating 
couples are detected? Calculate the total revenue of the hotel. 
b) Determine the elasticity of demand for the second guest. Determine the 
optimal price of the second guest using the elasticity of demand. 
Answer:  
a)   $80,   $10. Out of the 64 couples, 40 cheat and 24 report the 
second guest. Out of the 40 cheating couples, 8 are detected. Total 
revenue of the hotel is: 
• 30 x $80 =    $2,400 (single occupancy) 
• 24 x ($80 + $10)=  $2,160 (honest couples) 
• 10 x ($80 + $10)=     $900 (cheating couples who are 
caught pay for the second occupant) 
• 32 x $80 =   $2,560 (cheating couples who do not 
pay for the second occupant) 
Total:     $8,020. 
b) 3+,  64  (=.=.  . +1  0.2,  64  3.2 . 6  ?@A +B@,·B@?@+B@, (C.B@DE(C.B@, 6  1 $  3.2  64  3.2 $   10. 
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